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"It is all very well for you to say that you came of 
unhealthy parents, and had a severe accident in your 
childhood which permanently undermined your con-
stitution; ... You may say that it is not your fault. 
The answer is ready enough at hand, and it amounts to 
this-that if you had been born of healthy and well-to-
do parents, and had been well taken care of when you 
were a child, you would never have offended against the 
laws of your country, nor found yourself in your present 
disgraceful position. If you tell me you had no hand in 
your percentage and education, and that it is therefore 
unjust to lay these things to your charge I answer that 
whether your being in a consumption is your fault or 
not, it is a fault in you, and it is my duty to see that 
against such faults as this the commonwealth shall be 
protected. You may say that is your misfortune to be 
criminal; I answer that it is your crime to be 
unfortunate.'' 1 
Pre-Hearing Detention of Youthful 
Offenders: No Place to Go* 
by Paul B. Jones 
Paul B. Jones is currently a third year student at the 
Yale Law School and Assistant Director of the Yale Col-
lege Afro-American Studies Program. 
*Supported in part by the Planning Commission on 
Criminal Administration for the State of Connecticut. 
In reaction to the harsh dispositions and handling of 
youthful offenders by the criminal courts,2 the Illinois 
Legislature of 1899 initiated a system of juvenile justice 
which offered an alternative to the then current penal 
system.3 From its beginning, the juvenile court has been 
based upon the philosophy of "individualized justice"; 
that is, the individuality of the child, or the "whole 
child," is considered in the handling and disposition of 
his case. The decision of the juvenile court judge is not 
whether this boy or girl has committed a specific wrong, 
but "what is he, how has he become what he is, and 
what had best be done in his interest and in the interest 
of the state to save him from a downward career."4 
Traditional juvenile court theory has not placed primary 
emphasis upon an adversarial determination of guilt for a 
particular, isolated act. 5 Rather, it has adopted a 
remedial or rehabilitative role with the idea of correcting 
the potential, if not actual, development of a pattern of 
anti-social behavior.6 
Even though most authorities agree that the philoso-
phy of individualized justice constitutes a major step 
forward in the handling of youthful offenders,7 there 
has been increasing controversy over the nature of 
juvenile court ~roceedings at both the hearing and pre-
hearing stages. In recent years attacks have been sus-
tained against the juvenile courts' practice of denying 
children certain legal protections guaranteed by the 
Constitution to persons accused of crime.9 
In most jurisdictions juvenile court proceedings are 
1
et al.: Pre-Hearing Detention of Youthful Offenders
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1971
considered to be civil rather than criminal in nature; 
consequently, the Bill of Rights and its counterparts in 
state constitutions have not applied. 10 In justification of 
such practice, supporters of the traditional juvenile court 
have argued that the court is acting to help and to pro-
tect the child's interests, not to punish him.11 
The degree to which courts' practices measure up to 
their theory has of course recently been examined by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1967, under U.S. v. Gault11 a 
the Court ruled that several of the guarantees which 
derive from the Bill of Rights are applicable in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings even though delinquency pro· 
ceedings are still considered to be civil rather than 
criminal. Those guarantees include the right to notice, 
the right to counsel, and the right against self-incrimina-
tion. Quoting from Kent v. the United States, 12 the 
majority in Gault based its decision in part upon 
" ... [E]vidence ... that there may be grounds for con-
cern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: 
that he gets neither the protections accorded adults nor 
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated 
for children." 13 The Gault decision not only undermined 
many of the assumptions which support the constitu-
tionality of the juvenile court, but also recognized that 
the very nature of juvenile court proceedings requires 
adherence to· guarantees of due process at the hearing 
stage. 
The Court also stated, however, that it was not con· 
cerned with "the procedures or constitutional rights 
applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile 
process . .. " (emphasis added) ' 4 As a result, it is unclear 
whether the Court will require that the full range of pre-
trial procedural safeguards be applied to juveniles ac-
cused of law violation. 
Included among pre-hearing procedures are those 
governing custody of the child pending disposition. 
These procedures, like those applied at the hearing stage 
prior to Gault, derive from the philosophy of "individu-
alized justice" and Chancery's concept of parens 
patriae. 15 The court's concern for the lack of "solicitous 
care and regenerative treatment" in most juvenile court 
jurisdictions raises fundamental questions about the 
propriety of the current criteria for detention and of 
procedures intended to effect the detention or release of 
a child prior to adjudication. 
The following is a report of the findings of an eight-
month study of detention practices in New Haven, 
Connecticut, and considers the current practices of the 
New Haven Court with regard to (1) the traditional 
rationale for detaining youthful offenders prior to ad-
judication, and (2) the due process requirements of the 
Gault decision. 
In 1941, the Connecticut General Assembly revised 
the Juvenile Court Statute in order to establish its 
present statewide juvenile justice system.16 The revision 
divided the state into three districts and placed New 
Haven in the Second along with Middlesex and New 
London counties. 17 The juvenile court judge travels on 
circuit throughout each district, holding hearings in 
many of the local communities. 18 In each of the three 
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districts, however, there is only one receiving center to 
serve its total delinquent population. 19 The Receiving 
Center for the Second District is located in New Haven's 
Children's Building, a converted boarding house which 
also houses the hearing room, the judge's chamber, and 
offices for clerks, the supervisor of the probation staff, 
and the supervisor of the detention facility. 
The detention area is located on the second and third 
floors of the building. On the two floors, there is bed 
space for fifteen children, quarters for detention staff,20 
communal toilet facilities, dining facilities, a remedial 
school room, and a small medical examining room. 
There is also one centrally located "lounging area" on 
each of the two floors, but the only constructive recrea-
tion offered consists of daytime television. 
Compared to facilities available to juvenile courts in 
some other jurisdictions, the New Haven detention 
facility stands in a favorable light.21 Yet neither the 
supervisor of the detention staff nor members of the 
probation staff regard the facility as a suitable place for 
treatment or the beginning of a rehabilitative process. In 
regard to the adequacy of the detention facility, a mem-
ber of the court staff remarked, "We don't try to treat 
the kids that come through here. We can't. We just don't 
have the personnel or the type of facilities to make that 
possible. All we can do is keep the kids in line, feed 
them, and get them out."22 
While his concern for the lack of suitable treatment 
facilities is certainly warranted, it should be recognized 
that.the Connecticut Juvenile Court legislation does not 
impose an explicit, affirmat.i~e. oblig~tion u-Bon the state 
to make such treatment fac1htJes ava1lable. 3 Section 
17-46 simply provides that towns are authorized to 
provide or maintain detention homes for those children 
accused of crime who, in the opinion of the judge or the 
prosecutor, are in need of reformative rather than 
punitive treatment.24 In light of the vague statutory 
provision for detention facilities and the absence of a 
clear definition of the appropriate treatment for 
juveniles held in custody before adjudication, one must 
assume that the Connecticut legislature intended to 
leave the tasks of defining the detention function and 
prescribing appropriate facilities to the discretion of the 
juvenile court judges. 25 
The Decision Whether to Detain 
"If it appears from the petition that the child is in 
such condition that his welfare requires that his custody 
be immediately assumed, ... [The court) ... shall at once 
take the child into ... custody." (Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. 
Section 17-63) 
"Every day those little bastards come in here and rob 
us blind; but why should we call the police? They take 
the kid downtown and the very next day, he's back here 
again. Why don't these kids stay at home?" - Local 
merchant 
Detention has been defined as "the temporary care of 
children who require secure custody for their own or the 
community's protection in physically restricting facilities 
pending court disposition."26 Explaining which children 
fall under this definition, the Juvenile Court Rules for 
the State of Connecticut specify that there must be (I) a 
strong probability that the child will run away prior to 
court disposition, or (2) a strong probability that the 
child will commit other offenses before court disposi-
tion, or (3) reasonable cause to believe that the child's 
continued residence at home pending disposition will not 
safeguard the best interests of the child and the com-
munity because of the serious and dangerous nature of 
the alleged delinquent act.27 
There seems to be substantial variation in detention 
rates among different jurisdictions. For example, Freed 
and Wald report that "In some places, all children 
referred to juvenile court are detained. In others only 
two or three out of every hundred are held. A 50% ratio 
is not uncommon."28 While it may seem reasonable to 
suggest that the difference in detention rates among 
jurisdictions reflects a difference in numbers of serious 
offenses, the findings of this study corroborate the 
findings of comparative studies which report that this is 
not so.29 
Rather, different communities and even different 
probation officers within the same probation staff, use 
different criteria or interpretations of criteria. 30 It is this 
lack of uniformity - more than any other factor -
which accounts for variations in the rates of detention. 
Runaways 
The National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
recommends that a child be detained only if it is "almost 
certain" that he will run away. 31 In order to comply 
with this recommendation, the intake officer should 
have reasonable cause to believe that the child is a runa-
way at the time of detention or that he has a history of 
absenting himself from home without prior permission 
from his parent.32 
As previously noted, the Con'necticut Statute offers 
no explicit guidelines for intake officers. However, the 
Juvenile Court Rules do state that there must be a 
"strong probability"33 that the child will run away 
before he may be admitted to detention. Popular con-
notations which attach to the language of the Connecti-
cut rule and to the N.C.C.D. rule tend to suggest that the 
N .C .C .D. rule may provide a stricter test; but, unfortun-
ately, there is no Connecticut case law indicating what 
constitutes a "strong probability that the child will run 
away." 
According to one member of the staff "the court gets 
a tremendous number of kids who've run away from 
home; but quite frankly, we don't like to keep them. In 
the overwhelming majority of cases we notify the parent 3
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and try to get the kid back home as soon as possible."34 
In any event, the detention records do show that of all 
the children referred to the court in 1969, the over-
whelming majority were charged with running away. 
Among the 485 children detained, 113 (23%) were runa-
ways. It is interesting to note, however, that only 
thirteen of those children were adjudicated; the remain-
ing one hundred were detained less than forty-eight 
hours and were handled non-judicially.35 
Considering that all of the runaways were at large and 
referred to the detention facility initially by an arresting 
officer, it is clear that the New Haven intake officers 
were de facto in compliance with the N.C.C.D. recom-
mendation which suggests that the child be a runaway at 
the time of detention.36 Because all of the runaway 
children handled non-judicially were released within 
forty-eight hours it is also apparent that the primary 
reason for admitting them to the detention facility was 
not to guarantee appearance at a delinquency hearing. 37 
Nor do we find the true reason for detention in the 
probation officers' need for time to review each child's 
case history (if there was one) before allowing him to be 
released.38 Rather, correlation between the runaway 
allegation and the child's social history suggest that the 
runaways who were detained less than forty-eight hours 
were held for one of two reasons: inability to locate the 
parent or the immediate threat of the child suffering 
physical abuse at the hand of an irate parent.39 In the 
case of the 13 runaways who were detained and adjudi-
cated, the picture is somewhat but not significantly 
different. The average length of detention was 5 days, 
while the average time interval between referral and ad-
judication was 112 days. Once again it appears that the 
real purpose served by pre-hearing detention of runa-
ways in New Haven was not to assure the appearance of 
the child at the delinquency hearing. Case histories of 
these children show that the tenn of incarceration 
resulted from the fact that there was no place else for 
the child to stay while the probation officer sought a 
temporary placement pending disposition as an alterna-
tive to returning the child to a badly deteriorated home 
situation. 
Serious Offense and Danger of Committing 
Other Offenses 
The Connecticut Juvenile Court Rules also deem 
"seriousness of the offense" and "danger of the child 
committin§ other offenses" as acceptable criteria for 
detention. 0 Both these criteria are widely accepted 
among authorities and the latter is specifically author-
ized by statute as an acceptable criterion for detention 
in twelve states.41 Again the N.C.C.D. recommends that, 
before a child is admitted to detention on these grounds, 
the intake officer should be "almost certain" that the 
child will commit dangerous offenses,42 while the 
Connecticut rule requires "a strong probability".43 
Neither source, however, offers a definition of acts 
which constitute a danger to the community or to the 
child. The two initial problems, then, are first, to 
determine what constitutes a serious or dangerous 
offense; and second, to determine what evidence is 
relevant to deciding whether there is a strong probability 
that the child will commit other offenses. 
One study reports that for those juveniles accused of 
rape, arson, or an offense with a gun, detention was 
automatic.44 Another study confronted the problem of 
defining the serious offense and found that "if 'danger-
ous' is defined as including only offenses against per-
sons, then in only two localities were more than 10% of 
the juveniles detained because they were 'dangerous'."45 
In New Haven, the more serious offenses that were 
committed in 1969 cover aggravated assault, rape, 
robbery, breaking and entering, and Rossession of a 
dangerous weapon.46 Children charged with those 
offenses constituted only 15 .4% of the population 
detained. More revealing, however, is the fact that those 
children only represent 40% of all the youthful offenders 
charged with and adjudicated for the offenses listed 
above. The remaining 60% were not detained at all prior 
to adjudication. When asked about the practice of re-
leasing children who had allegedly committed a serious 
offense, one court officer responded: 
"First of all, we don't have enough room. So many kids 
who don't have any place to stay come through here 
that we try to get as many of the other kids out as we 
possibly can - especially toward the weekends. So, 
naturally, if a parent is willing to accept a child and if 
we think the parent is fairly reliable, we let the kid go." 
But then why detain for an average of five days 40% 
of the children charged with serious offenses?47 If the 
court is not worried about the child appearing on the 
scheduled hearing date and if it also has reason to believe 
that the child will receive adequate custodial attention 
at home, then why is he detained at all? 
The answer lies, in part, in the hypothetical local 
merchant, the next door neighbor, or the interested tax-
payer, who, in the view of court staff, demands safer 
streets. 
"Of course, we hold a few of the kids because we 
want a psychological evaluation, but we also have to 
keep in mind that the police officer who brings the child 
here usually does so only after he - or the kid's neigh-
bors - have had all the nonsense they can take. In light 
of that we don't feel that it's in our best interest, the 
kid's best interest, or the community's best interest to 
put him right back on the street." 
Deciding who to detain is a problem of balancing the 
desirability of the individual's freedom prior to adjudica-
tion with legitimate community concern for law en-
forcement and the reduction of the damage or annoy-
ance which may result from a child's misdemeanant or 
felonious behavior. Detention based upon the danger of 
the child "committing other offenses" implies that 
interest in reducing the possibility of additional offenses 
31 
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against person or property supercedes the interest in 
protecting the child's right to freedom. 
Assuming for the moment that detention for such 
preventive purposes is desirable, what evidence is used tci 
determine whether there is a "strong probability' 1 that 
the child will commit another offense? In New Haven, 
the statistics indicate that prior delinquent behavior is 
thought to be a strong determinant. For example, of the 
fifty children adjudicated for an offense against property, 
only two were detained. But of the twenty-seven child-
ren adjudicated for violation of probation by virtue of 
an offense against property, 73% were detained.48 This 
large increase in the percentage of children detained was 
characteristic of every category of offense where the 
offense resulted in violation of. probation, but in no 
category was the increase greater than in that of auto 
theft. While 33% of the children charged with auto theft 
alone were detained, 100% of those charged with viola-
tion of probation by virtue of auto theft were incarcer-
ated prior to adjudication. 
Incorrigibility 
The Advisory Council of Judges recommends that 
children with strained family relationships are likely to 
get into further trouble and, hence, should be de-
tained.49 While there is yet no empirical data to validate 
this hypothesis, so it is true that many of the children 
with strained family relationships are detained. In New 
Haven, 88% of all the children who were allegedly in-
corrigible and adjudicated in 1969 were also detained 
prior to adjudication. s 1 According to the supervisor of 
the New Haven probation staff, the primary reason for 
the high rate of detention among children charged with 
incorrigibility is not fear of the additional trouble they 
may get into, but that "There's no place for these child-
ren to go." Because the complaint alleging incorrigibility 
is filed by the parent, it provides evidence of explicit 
conflict between the parent and the child, and so it is 
hardly surprising that the overwhelming majority of 
these children do end up on the detention facility. 
As a matter of policy, however, the New Haven staff 
discourages parents from seeking refuge from a trouble-
some child by refusing to assume custody. In a recent 
directive rehearsing regulations for admitting children to 
detention, the supervisor of detention and the supervisor 
of probation stated that 
"Parent's refusal to receive the child into his home shall 
not, in itself, be cause for placing the child in detention. 
Parents cannot shirk their responsibility toward their 
own children in this manner. Such parents should be 
advised to contact the juvenile court on the following 
workday. "s2 
In spite of the directive, the record shows that among 
the children detained, the largest group still consisted of 
those who were charged with incorrigibility. s 3 
After Detention 
Commitment 
While it is true that 87% of the children committed 
had been detained prior to adjudication, this study 
shows that the 87% represents only 37% of the total 
population of children detained.s4 The majority of 
juveniles adjudicated, then, are returned to the com-
munity whether they were detained or not.ss But a 
closer look at the cases involving children who were 
committed reveals that basically the criteria used by the 
court at the detention stage are also used to determine 
whether or not to commit a child-for an indeterminate 
period s6 -to the commissioner of child welfare. 
None of the children who were detained for having 
committed a serious offense were subsequently com-
mitted. 27% of the children detained on the basis of a 
complaint alleging incorrigibility were subsequently 
committed. But the record also shows that 100% of the 
children who violated probation by virtue of incor-
rigibility were committed - regardless of whether they 
were detained or not.s 7 Considering that one of the 
purposes of the traditional juvenile court is to perform a 
remedial function by correcting the development of a 
pattern of delinquency, this is perhaps not surprising. 
But note that children charged with incorrigibility or 
violation of probation by virtue of incorrigibility 
account for 40% of all the children committed by the 
New Haven Court in 1969. 
Release: recidivism 
The findings of the preceding section reveal that the 
New Haven juvenile court makes extensive use of the 
broad discretionary power vested in it by the Connecti-
cut legislature to hold children who allegedly cause 
problems for their parents. As noted earlier, such 
practice places an extra burden on the intake officer 
who is at the pre-hearing detentiqn stage with another 
set of children who have allegedly committed acts which 
would be crimes if they had been committed by adults. 
Space limitation within the detention facility often re-
quires that the decision to release such law violators be 
based upon available bed space. When bed space is 
available for children other than parental nuisances in-
take officers next isolate those children who have 
violated probation-regardless of the offense. 
Detention of probation violators may be premised on 
the belief that since this class of children is recidivist, it 
is dangerous. But while the average time interval be-
tween the initial referral and adjudication was 121 
days,s8 the average length of detention for the twenty- 5
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nine children who were incarcerated was five days. Thus 
all of the children included in the study59 were free to 
commit other offenses before adjudication. The record 
shows that 12 (38%) of those detained committed other 
offenses before adjudication, while 9 (43%) of those not 
detained committed other offenses. One also finds that 
18 of the 21 (87 .7%) children who committed offenses 
before adjudication had previous records (Section 11-B 
of Table C). We conclude from these findings, then, that 
(1) short-term detention does little to correct the anti-
social behavior of those children who have previous 
records,60 and (2) relative to children who have no 
previous record, there is a high probability that children 
who have previous records will commit other offenses. It 
would seem to follow that if the New Haven court were 
to authorize the long-term incarceration of 100% of the 
children who have a previous record, the rate of law 
violations occurring during the period of release would 
drop by 85.7%. But section 11-B of Table C also indi-
cates that of all the children who had previous records, 
exactly 50% repeated while 50% did not. So incarcera-
tio·n of all those with previous records would result in 
the unnecessary detention of 50% of the children. 
Detention Alternatives 
Findings of the preceding section raise serious doubts 
about the capacity of the traditional juvenile cou~t to 
deal with rising juvenile crime. The increase in the num-
ber of youth offenses has forced the juvenile court to 
perform functions essentially similar to those exercised 
by any court adjudicating cases of persons charged with 
dangerous and disturbing behavior. Yet, the procedures 
of the juvenile court - including those applied at the 
pre-hearing detention stage - tend to ignore that aspect 
of the judicial function which looks to the protection of 
society. The focus has been - and still is - directed 
toward the common interest of the state and of the 
child in protecting the welfare of the latter. 
Judge Ketcham has described this view of juvenile 
court procedures in terms of a "mutual compact theory" 
-a relationship created between the state (acting 
through the juvenile court) on one hand, and the child 
charged with delinquency on the other. Under this 
theory, detention can be regarded as a bargain or agree-
ment whereby the state is permitted to intervene con-
structively in the child's life, while the child, in return, 
must give up certain constitutional safeguards.61 Among 
other things, the compact authorizes the juvenile court 
to substitute state control for parental control; but 
"such an intrusion of governmental supervision rests on 
the assumption that the state will act in the best interests 
of the child and that its intervention will enhance the 
child's welfare."62 
Shelter Care 
Turning first to the case of those children detained on 
the strength of complaints alleging "runaway" and 
"incorrigibility," the court's own testimony would seem 
to indicate that physically restricting facilities in no way 
enhance the welfare of either the child or the 
community. 
This study has demonstrated that it is not fear of the 
child's failure to appear for the delinquency adjudication 
or fear of the danger he poses to the community which 
results in pre-hearing detention, but rather that, apart 
from the detention facility, there is no place for runaway 
or incorrigible children to stay. Under these circum-
stances, fairness to the child does not necessarily militate 
against the court assuming temporary custody. But in 
such cases "shelter care," i.e. "temporary care in physi-
cally unrestricting facilities,"63 is recommended as a 
more appropriate means of enhancing the child's welfare. 
At the present time, the Uniform Act,64 the Model 
Rules,65 and no less than nine states have provisions for 
shelter care.66 According to those provisions, however, 
such facilities are intended for neglected and dependent 
children only.67 Is this reasonable? Is there really such a 
sharp distinction between a child charged with a status 
offense68 and a neglected child? The court rules which 
authorize the detention of "delinquent youth" and 
simultaneously forbid the detention of neglected youth 
assume that there are some rather important differences. 
But consider the Matter of A. M.,a non-judici_?l case 
handled by the New Haven court in 1970. 
The complaint, filed by the respondent's mother, 
alleged that A. M. was delinquent by virtue of difficult 
behavior at home and by virtue of having absented him-
self from home without prior parental permission. A. M. 
was placed in detention, but when the probation officer 
read the complaint and learned that the child was only 
eleven years old, immediate steps were taken to notify 
the parent and to secure the child's release. However, 
when the mother was reached and informed of the 
court's decision to release A. M., she responded that 
under no circumstances would she take the child, and 
that if he was returned to the home "there would be 
real trouble." 
A conversation with A. M. revealed that the com-
plaint arose from a series of disputes between himself 
and his mother over A. M.'s possession of several 
"Jehovah's Witness" publications. According to A. M., 
"Mother don't like 'em cause her boyfriend laughs at her 
when he sees 'em." The mother confiscated the maga-
zines along with other reading materials provided for the 
child by a Sunday school. But when she did, A. M. 
walked out, only to be apprehended one hour later on a 
nearby playground, and placed in the detention facility 
by the New Haven police. 
By remanding A. M. to the detention facility, the 
court exercised the only option available. But to argue 
that under these circumstances A. M.'s welfare was en-
hanced by the consequent deprivation of liberty is to 
beg the issue. It is precisely because of those circum-
stances surrounding the matter of A. M. that the ques-
tion remains: is it wise or fair to distinguish between 
children alleged to be delinquent and those who are 
allegedly neglected on the basis of the type of complaint 
filed? While it is true that A. M. was technically a runa-
way and therefore a delinquent, the circumstances of the 
33 
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case indicate that the tension at home caused the runa-
way, and incarceration of the youth does not treat in 
any socially useful manner the causal factors which 
created the tension. 
In at least one respect, however, the discussion of 
which children should be placed in shelter care is acade-
mic. The State of Connecticut provides no such facilities. 
In recommending that they be authorized and establish-
ed, we suggest that an initial presumption in favor of 
release to the parents is desirable. But if such a presump-
tion should fail, that there be a presumption in favor of 
maintaining custody of neglected children as well as 
status offenders in shelter-care units rather than in de-
tention facilities pending their release or disposition. 
Further, such children should not be transferred from 
the shelter-care unit to the detention facility until they 
demonstrate by actual disruptive behavior that con-
tinued care in the physically unrestricting facility is no 
longer feasible. 
Even though shelter-care facilities as well as the sug-
gested presumptions may be in keeping with the spirit of 
the juvenile court legislation, it must be remembered 
that there are many problems associated with both the 
operation of such facilities and with the criteria for 
admission and release-problems which have not yet 
been articulated or thoroughly examined. For example, 
should all status offenders be admitted to shelter care 
until their disruptive behavior demonstrates that such 
care is no longer feasible? Should children charged with 
more serious offenses also be eligible for shelter care? If 
so, under what circumstances? Should the state bear the 
cost of maintaining the child in a shelter care facility? 
What criteria should determine when the condition 
which brought the child to the facility no longer exists? 
Preventive Detention 
The children charged with law violation present a 
different type of problem. Some critics of the juvenile 
court suggest that even these children should be eligible 
for shelter-care rather than detention.69 but most 
authorities agree that, barring the presence of home 
problems, law violators should, depending upon the 
nature of the offense and the history of previous court 
contacts, either be released or held in physically re-
striding facilities pending disposition.70 The most com-
mon reason given for this preference is that co-mingling 
law violators with neglected or dependent children 
exposes the latter to the unwholesome influence of the 
more experienced juvenile offender. 71 
Again, however, the incarceration of law-violators in 
detention facilities which do not provide "the solicitous 
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children" 
places the juvenile court in the position of subordinating 
the interest of the child to the welfare of the com-
munjty. This practice is tantamount to preventive de-
tention and should be recognized as such, in spite of 
protests asserting that the child benefits from the brief 
respite or from the psychological evaluations obtained 
by the court during the period of incarceration. In fact, 
psychological testing has been rejected as a proper func-
tion of pre-hearing detention. 
"Some probation departments and law enforcement 
agencies defend their detention practices on the grounds 
that detention is of therapeutic value to the child. 
Others frankly admit that children are detained because 
of the convenience in conducting investigations and ad-
ministering psychological examinations. While detention 
may have a therapeutic effect in selected cases, in the 
Commission's view, it is neither the function of law en-
forcement agencies nor probation departments to use it 
for this purpose. In our opinion, this is clearly and un-
mistakably a judicial responsibility which must be 
arrived at after juvenile court jurisdiction has been 
established. " 72 
If the juvenile court can no longer claim that youth-
ful law violators are detained prior to adjudication for 
the purpose of facilitating the court's physical or 
psychological evaluations, it must concede that those 
law violators detained are either being punished before 
jurisdiction has been established or that they are being 
held for preventive purposes. By recognizing that it is 
detaining children for preventive purposes the court 
would be contending that it is justifiably responding to 
community pressure for safer streets. But the court must 
also recognize that there are as yet no sound predictive 
criteria for determining which children actually pose a 
threat to the community .73 
Without such criteria the most reasonable approach 
to combining "fairness to the child" with protection of 
the community is careful adherence to standards of due 
process at the pre-hearing stage. 
Detention Procedures: Current Practice 
In order to understand what "careful adherence to 
due process standards" means in the context of the 
juvenile court, we must first review the current pro-
cedures. 
The decision to detain a child is made at four differ-
ent levels by individuals with different professional 
skills. The first among the decision makers is the 
arresting officer. Although this study does not include 
an examination of police practice, it should be noted 
that when the arresting officer decides to refer a child to 
the detention facility, he is choosing one of a number of 
alternatives available to him. Among his options, those 
most commonly used are: ( 1) release; (2) release ac-
companied by an official report; (3) release and referral 
to the juvenile court without detention; and ( 4) referral 
to the juvenile court with detention. 74 Of the juveniles 
referred to the New Haven court in 1969, 20.8% were 
detained,75 and well over 90% of those children were 
taken to the detention facility by the police.76 Theoreti-
cally, the police jurisdiction and influence ends at court 
intake 77 yet it is difficult to determine where the actual 
' . ff 78 influence of the arresting officer ceases to have e ect. 
When the juvenile is referred to detention, he meets 7
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an "intake officer."79 In New Haven, that officer hap-
pens to be the supervisor of the detention staff. "In-
take," it should be noted, is a term which is by no means 
limited in application to the detention function; it 
refers, in the more general sense, to a screening process 
to determine whether the court should take action in a 
given case and, if so, what action. 80 It is not a legal 
term, and except in the cases of juvenile and family 
courts the term is foreign to the judicial process. 81 In 
the criminal court, at the post-arrest stage, decisions to 
screen out are functions of the grand jury, the judge, or 
the prose cu tor. 82 There, screening is an end in itself. In 
the juvenile court, however, "The function of intake is 
likely to be more ambitious than its criminal law 
counterpart."83 This is largely because "intake" is in-
herited from the social work tradition84 and also be-
cause its officers, administrative rather than judicial 
personnel, are neither legally trained nor significantly 
restricted in the exercise of their discretionary authority 
by the procedural requirements which are a part of the 
criminal law.85 
When the intake officer, or, in the case of New Haven, 
the supervisor of detention, first encounters the child, he 
determines whether the ~arents have been notified of 
the child's whereabouts. 6 He then asks whether the 
arresting officer has apprised the child of his right to 
counsel and his right to remain silent.87 If the child has 
not been so advised the supervisor himself performs that 
duty. But beyond that, the only other duties he per-
forms at that point are administrative. They consist of 
(1) completing the "detention record," a standardized 
form reciting information sufficient to locate and 
identify the child and stating the reason for detention; 
(2) notifying the appropriate probation officer of the 
child's presence in the detention facility; and (3) en-
couraging the probation officer to detain or release the 
child, depending upon the youth's attitude, the nature 
of his offense, and his previous record. 
If the probation officer intends to continue the de-
tention of the child, he must file a delinquency petition 
within 24 hours88 and a detention order within 48 hours 
of the initial referral.89 However, since the Gault 
decision, probation officers in the New Haven jurisdic-
tion have had difficulty complying with this rule. One 
probation officer observed that, "Since Gault requires 
that we notify both the parent and the child of the 
right to counsel, we don't interview the child at all until 
he's in the company of his parent. But, under those 
circumstances, efficiency is out of the question. Getting 
the mother or the father to show up sometimes presents 
a serious problem." 
Of course, an informative interview with the child 
himself is essential to determining whether he should be 
detained or released, but the question is how and under 
what conditions the information should be gathered. 
Current procedures require the probation officer to 
conduct the interview before the delinquency adjudica-
tion if the child admits that he is responsible for the acts 
alleged, or before the dispositional hearing if he denies 
the allegation.90 
In cases involving detention, however, it is most com-
mon to find that the probation officer has performed 
this duty within the 48-hour period prescribed for execu-
tion of the "detention order."91 
In keeping with the social work heritage of the intake 
function, the interview itself is intended to facilitate a 
social investigation. According to the Connecticut 
juvenile court legislation92 and Cinque v Boy93 the first 
major Connecticut case to uphold the constitutionality 
of that legislation, the investigation must include the 
following information: 
"Investigation prior to the hearing is provided for. .. 
the facts in the case, consisting of an examination of the 
parentage and surroundings of the child, his age, habits 
and history, home conditions, and the character of his 
parents or guardians. In case of alleged delinquency, the 
investigation is to be made by the probation officer."94 
As a preliminary measure, however, the juvenile court 
rules provide for: 
"A conference between the investigating officer and 
[the] child and his parents, as called for by the notice to 
appear, wherein the child, in the parent's presence, is in-
formed of his rights, told of the allegations of the com-
plaint, and requested to make his answer thereto in 
order to insure that all further court proceedings are 
legally compatible with the stated position of the child 
and his parents. " 95 
Even though the probation officer also has the 
authority to remove the child from the custody of the 
parent at that initial interview ,96 it appears that such 
practice is not common among the New Haven probation 
staff. However, if the child is already in detention at the 
time of the interview, the probation officer informs the 
child of his right to a detention hearing. 97 That informa-
tion is of critical importance to the child because (I) in 
spite of the probation officer's recommendation, release 
is subject to the discretion of the judge, and (2) the 
child's right to bail exists "only under exceptional 
circumstances. " 98 
In view of the fact that the informing of rights is an 
important function of the initial interview, there are at 
least three points in this process at which the child's 
freedom is jeopardized: (1) the informal interview, 
(2) the detention hearing, and (3) the application of bail. 
Areas for Reform 
The Initial Interview: Exercise of Waiver 
While it is the duty of the probation officer con-
ducting the interview to inform the child of his right to 
counsel and his right to remain silent, it is not uncom-
35 
8
Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 1 [1971], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yrlsa/vol1/iss4/3
36 
mon to see a child, in the company of his parent, waive 
his rights. If a child does elect to exercise those rights, 
the interview is stopped and the matter is scheduled for 
a "contested," or adverserial, hearing on the merits. 99 
However, if the child is in detention at the time of the 
interview and if he also elects to exercise his right to a 
detention hearing, the court must grant the request and 
hold the hearing "not later than 24 hours after the filing 
of the delinquent petition." 100 
Before the Gault decision, waiver of the right to 
counsel and waiver of the right to remain silent pre-
sented no legal problems for the probation officer be-
cause, prior to that decision, the juvenile had neither a 
constitutional right to counsel nor a constitutional right 
against self-incrimination. Noting, however, that the 
Supreme Court has extended those rights, particularly 
the right to counsel, to juveniles who may be committed, 
lower courts following Gault have explained that 
"Where, as in both proceedings for juveniles and 
mentally deficient persons, the state undertakes to act 
parens patriae, it has the inescapable duty to vouchsafe 
due process, and this necessarily includes a duty to see 
that a subject 6f an involuntary commitment proceeding 
is afforded the opportunity to guiding hand of legal 
counsel at every step of the proceedings, unless effec-
tively waived by one authorized to act in his behalf." 101 
Thus the New Haven jurisdiction, and most others, 
have held that the right to counsel as well as the right to 
remain silent attach whenever a child is subject to "in 
cu'Stody interrogation." 102 Put simply, Gault held that 
these rights attach whenever the outcome is essentially 
criminal (i.e., whenever there is a danger of commit-
ment). The Connecticut practice may appear to provide 
more protection than those mandated by the Supreme 
Court; however, when one considers that each of a 
child's encounters with the juvenile court is treated 
cumulatively rather than separately, it becomes apparent 
that each encounter - regardless of the outcome - may 
become evidence at a hearing which results in commit-
ment. Furthermore, the juvenile court's practice of con-
sidering the nature of the offense as only a part of the 
evidence for commitment, makes it difficult to predict 
at the outset whether the proceeding will result in 
commitment. 
In light of these circumstances, it seems appropriate 
to treat each juvenile court encounter as if it could result 
in commitment of the child. But while the courts may 
reasonably extend due process safeguards early in the 
proceedings, there remains the problem of determining 
when and under what conditions a child may exercise 
waiver. The Gault decision did discuss the waiver of the 
right to counsel and the right to remain silent, but it did 
not fully analyze the problems which stem from the 
improper implementation of waiver. In regard to the 
waiver of the right to counsel the court ruled that: 
"They (Gerald and Mrs. Gault) had a right expressly to 
be advised that they might retain counsel and to be con-
fronted with the need for specific consideration of 
whether they did or did not choose to waive the 
right." 103 
Then, in discussing whether the right to counsel 
applied to delinquency proceedings which may result in 
commitment, the court noted that, in light of Miranda 
v. Arizona, 104 it must also consider whether the right 
against self-incrimination "can effectively be waived un-
less counsel is present or the right to counsel has been 
waived." 105 However, in providing an answer to this 
question the court only ruled that 
"We appreciate that special problems may arise with 
respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of 
children, and that there may well be some differences 
in technique - but not in principle - depending upon 
tli.e age of the child and the presence and competence of 
parents. The participation of counsel will, of course, 
assist the police,juvenile courts and appellate tribunals in 
administering the privilege. If counsel is not present for 
some permissible reason when an admission is obtained, 
the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admis-
sion was voluntary, in the sense not only that it has not 
been coerced or suggested,but also that it is not the 
product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, 
fright or despair." 106 
The majority opinion here did not go far in explaining 
what conditions are most conducive to "an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege, 107 and it is doubtful whether the Court will 
ever hold that there is a single constitutionally accept-
able way in which a juvenile can waive a right. However, 
the court's warning against the admission into evidence 
of any inculpatory statements which might be the pro-
duct of coercion articulates the undeniable importance 
of guaranteeing that neither the right to counsel nor the 
right against self-incrimination are frivolously or fear-
fully waived. Of equal importance in this regard is the 
protection against any waiver of the right to a detention 
hearing which may be prompted by coercive tactics or 
administrative zeal. In New Haven, such a waiver results 
in the child's immediate loss of freedom for a period up 
to, but not exceeding, IO days. 108 
The consequences of waiving the above-mentioned 
rights and the undesirability of such waivers resulting 
from various forms of coercion raise considerable doubt 
about the propriety of perpetuating New Haven's current 
plea-taking and investigatory procedures. As previous-
ly noted, those steps are completed at an informal con-
ference between the probation officer, the child, and the 
child's parent. Of course, the child as well as the parent 
has the right to have counsel present. If either the child 
or the parent is without legal counsel at the interview 
but wishes to have such counsel, the interview will be 
halted in order to allow the child and/or the parent to 
retain counsel (or have counsel appointed by the court) 
prior to the delinquency adjudication. Of course, the 
adequacy of these procedures depends in large measure 
upon the absence of conflict between parent and child. 
Without the support of his parent, it is doubtful whether 
the child will understand or feel confident that he can 
have counsel, that he can remain silent, and that he can 
contest the probation officer's decision to continue his 
incarceration. . 
In answer to arguments asserting that, under circum-
stances of family conflict, it is the probation officer's 9
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duty to protect the child's interest, consider the 
Supreme Court's description of the probation officer's 
role at the hearing stage. 
"The probation officer cannot act as counsel for the 
child. His role in the adjudicatory hearing, by statute 
and in fact, is as arresting officer and witness against the 
child." 109 
If this description is any less applicable at the inter-
view or "plea-taking" stage, the fact remains that, given 
conflict between the parent and the child, the probation 
officer is placed under the considerable burden of ex-
tracting a statement of responsibility or a written waiver 
of the right to a detention hearing and simultaneously 
insuring that the circumstances permit an uncoerced, 
intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. 110 The 
comment of one probation officer at a recent staff 
meeting indicates that this may not be possible. "Just 
last week I was in that situation. They (the parents and 
the child) formed their lines. If I leaned toward helping 
the child, I would have complefely lost the parents. But 
if I leaned toward the parents, I would have lost all 
contact with the child." 111 
Previous sections of this article indicate not only that 
conflict between the parent and the child is common 112 
but that an allegation of incorrigibility imposes addition-
al hardship upon the child. 88% of all the children 
alleged to be incorrigible were detained prior to adjudi-
cation and 40% of all the children committed by the 
New Haven court in 1969 were delinquent by virtue of 
incorrigibility .113 It would appear that the high per-
centage of cases characterized by explicit conflict be-
tween parent and child would prompt the court to 
recognize that the greatest care must be taken to assure 
that any waiver by the child is executed without 
coercion. 
To illustrate the danger of coercion which is inherent 
in the interview setting, consider the matter of M. S., a 
case characterized by a serious violation of the law as 
well as parental conflict. 
M. S. is a black fourteen-year-old who allegedly set 
fire to her own home while both parents were away. 
Upon receipt of the complaint, the intake officer placed 
M. S. in detention and the probation officer continued 
her detention until the interview preceeding a possible 
detention hearing. At the interview M. S. and her mother 
were advised of the right to counsel but the mother was 
opposed to retaining counsel, probably because of the 
onerous financial burden already incurred as a result of 
the fire's damage to the house. M. S., who remained 
rather sullen and non-communicative throughout most 
of her stay in the detention facility, was indifferent to 
acquiring retained or appointed counsel but insisted, 
after being asked to sign a statement of responsibility, 
that she did not set the fire. However, she did admit to 
setting two smaller fires in the home on previous 
occasions. Further inquiry revealed that M. S. believed 
that her sister, the complainant in this case, had set the 
fire with the express intention of inculpating her (M. S.), 
in order to retaliate for a number of past disputes. 
When the matter of a detention hearing was raised, 
the probation officer informed both the parent and the 
child that the recommendation to the judge would be for 
continued detention unless Mrs. S. could assure the pro-
bation officer that M. S. would have suitable lodging and 
custodial attention until the hearing. Because Mrs. S. 
wouJd give no such assurance, the probation officer 
quite candidly urged the child to waive her right to a 
hearing because, under the circumstances, it was almost 
certain that the judge would remand her to the detention 
facility. 
Although the allegations themselves suggest a great 
strain in the parent-child relationship, the court certainly 
should have been warned of conflicting interests when 
the parent expressed no desire to retain counsel for the 
child or to provide suitable lodging until the delinquency 
adjudication. Under the circumstances, it appears that 
the better course would have been to bring the interview 
to a halt and test the waiver against the Miranda 
standards before proceeding. Those standards are in-
tended to inform a defendant of the exact nature of his 
rights and to "overcome the inherent pressures of the 
interrogation atmosphere";114 yet clearly in this case 
neither the parent nor the probation officer helped to 
overcome that pressure. 
In Gallegos v. Colorado, 115 the Court discussed a 
similar situation and held that "[the child] ... would 
have no way of knowing what the consequences of his 
confession were without advice as to his rights-from 
someone concerned with securing those rights - and 
without the aid of more mature judgment as to the 
steps he should take in the predicament in which he 
found himself. .. " 116 Later, in the same opinion, the 
Court reversed a conviction based upon the confession 
obtained from the uncounseled child and warned that 
"There is no guide to the decision of cases such as this, 
except the totality of circumstances" (emphasis 
added). 117 
In New Haven, as previously noted, the "totality of 
the circumstances" of the interview setting is often 
characterized by parent-child conflict and an absence of 
legal counsel. The probation officer must choose one of 
two courses. He may proceed with the interview after 
advising the child of his right to counsel and right to 
remain silent (as he did in the matter of M. S.). But if he 
elects this course, he faces the dilemma of having to 
secure a statement of responsibility or a waiver of the 
right to a detention hearing, while simultaneously having 
to protect the child's rights. In addition there is the 
danger of the child's case being prejudiced at the 
delinquency hearing. That danger results from the pro-
bation officer's authority to prepare and admit his social 
investigation as testimony before adjudication. When the 
probation officer exercises that authority, the judge has 
the opportunity to read the report at the delinquency 
adjudication - before ascertaining whether the child still 
maintains that he is responsible for the acts alleged. 
The social investigation thus acquires testimonial 
character and, consequently, raises the potential issue of 
self-incrimination. 
If the probation officer elects to follow the second 
course and refuses to conduct the interview until the 
child is in company of counsel, there is a greater 
probability that the child's rights will be protected - but 
there is also the marked disadvantage of additional delay. 
The average time interval between initial referral and 
adjudication is 121 days and a policy requiring counsel 
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at every interview where there is the danger of parent-
child conflict will not help to reduce the lag between 
referral and adjudication. 
Recommendation for Change 
A proper solution would seem to require the elimina-
tion of the pre-hearing interview. In its place, the court 
should substitute an arraignment hearing for every 
matter serious enough to require a judicial determination 
of delinquency. That hearing should be presided over by 
the judge or a court-appointed referee and should be 
held no later than 15 days after referral in cases involv-
ing no detention, and no later than 48 hours after the 
filing of a delinquency petition in cases which do involve 
pre-hearing detention. Not only should retained counsel 
or a public defender always be present, but the judge or 
referee should be re~uired to appoint a guardian ad /item 
where practicable. 11 This would facilitate the separa-
tion of judicial roles, a problem which now plagues the 
attorney practicing in the juvenile court .119 
"[The Lawyer] must stand as the ardent defender of 
his client's constitutional and legal rights ... [with] the 
concepts of "guardianship" ... [seeming] to require that 
not only the legal rights but the general welfare of the 
minor be thrown on the scale in the weighing by counsel 
of his course of action ... [The guardian further] must 
assume the duty of interpreting the court and its 
objective to both child and parent .... " 120 
The function of the hearing should be limited to 
advising the child of his rights in accordance with the 
Gault and Gallegos requirements, reciting the allegations, 
and taking a plea. But if the child should deny the 
allegations, it would also seem necessary to enter a 
findi~g of probable cause. 121 
The advantages of such a model include (1) greater 
protection of the child'srights and the consequent 
reduction of unwarranted investigations before jurisdic-
tion has been established; (2) a more expeditious deter-
mination of the state's burden of proof and the sufficien-
cy of its evidence; (3) a greater opportunity to challenge 
allegations of incorrigibility and to amend the complaint 
to neglect; and ( 4) a reduced burden upon the probation 
officer and a greater opportunity for him to devote his 
time to casework. The disadvantages include (I) greater 
formality at the preadjudication level, (2) an increase of 
judicial personnel, (3) the necessity of formulating 
more efficient mechanisms for retaining assistance of 
court appointed counsel, and ( 4) an increase in cost. 
Obviously, there are many other advantages and dis-
advantages associated with the proposed model, and this 
article does not pretend to list them all. Nevertheless, it 
should be apparent that the problems created by the cur-
rent procedures are serious enough to warrant further 
examination and consideration of the proposed model. 
The Detention Hearing: 
Nature of the Proceedings 
In describing the nature of the detention hearing, the 
juvenile court rules provide that "The court may admit 
into evidence any testimony that is material and relevant 
to the issue of detention."122 But even though the rules 
require that the probation officer have "reasonable cause 
to believe that the child is responsible for the acts 
alleged," there is no requirement for a finding of 
"probable cause" at the detention hearing.123 The judge 
may remand the child to detention for a period not to 
exceed 15 days unless, at the end of that period, a 
second judicial hearing finds that the condition which 
first resulted in the detention of the child still persists.124 
The proposed model would also require several 
changes in the detention hearing itself. Under current 
New Haven procedures, that hearing is initiated only in 
response to a written or oral request by the child. In 
1969, the court held detention hearings for only 31 out 
of the one hundred forty-nine juveniles who were de-
tained beyond 48 hours prior to adjudication. The re-
maining children waived the right to the hearing. 
Criticizing high rates of detention, the President's 
Task Force on Youth Crime asserts that "the law should 
require (and judges should compel) that a detention 
hearing be held within no more than 48 hours of initial 
detention." 125 One might question whether the Task 
Force agrees with the policy of applying waiver concepts 
where the right to a detention hearing may be for-
feited;126 in any event, the waiver practices which were 
discussed earlier clearly demonstrate the danger of 
coercion when an uncounseled child is told by an officer 
of the court, "You have the right to a hearing if you 
want it, but I doubt that it will get you out of here." 127 
Addressing itself to that very situation, the Crim.e Com-
mission reports that in order to assure "procedural 
justice for the child," it is necessary that "counsel. .. be 
appointed as a matter of course whenever coercive 
action is a possibility, without requiring any affirmative 
choice by child or parent."128 In that context, it be-
comes apparent that procedural justice requires the 
presence of counsel whenever the possibility of waiver 
exists and whenever a detention hearing is held. 
The extent to which detention hearings will limit un-
warranted incarceration depends not only upon the 
presence of counsel but also upon the criteria for deten-
tion, the nature of admissable evidence, and the scope of 
the hearing. As previously noted, the Court Rules 
governing the nature of the detention hearing provide 
that "The Court may admit into evidence any testimony 
that is material and relevant to the issue of deten-
tion."129 Such evidence includes "the bases for deten-
tion" which were examined earlier in this article (i.e., 
strong probability of runaway, strong probability of 
committing other offenses and seriousness of 
offense ).130 Yet in spite of the reference to serious 
offenses or "danger to the community," there is no 
provision for a judicial determination of probable cause. 
Of course, there are other areas of the law in which 
that practice is sanctioned. For example, prediction of 
future dangerous conduct forms the basis for confine-
11
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ment in proceedings for commitment of the mentally 
ill, sexual psychopaths, and defective delinquents. 131 
Those commitment statutes are designed to protect 
society by confining for an indeterminate period those 
offenders who have demonstrated habitual deviant 
behavior, and to provide medical treatment for their 
cure. 132 In examining those procedures, the Harvard 
Law Review raised an interesting proposition: 
"If a case arose in which medical testimony indicated 
that a patient could not be helped by treatment (either 
because no treatment was known for his illness or be-
cause the available hospital had inadequate facilities) but 
he was nonetheless committed as dangerous, the court 
might well hold that the state was punishing the patient 
for an illness and thus inflicting cruel and unusual 
punishment."133 (Emphasis added) 
In this light, consider the case of a juvenile charged with 
a serious offense or a child thought to represent a danger 
to the community. Under current procedures such 
children are confined with the sanction of the court, not 
because they are being punished but because such deten-
tion is intended to offer "solicitious care and regenera-
tive treatment." 134 But it is precisely the inadequacy of 
such care and treatment which prompted this comment. 
Under present procedure one might argue that pre-
hearing detention without a finding of probable cause 
amounts to a denial of due process. 
In a recent federal case, Cooley v. Stone, 135 a 
sixteen-year-old boy charged with burglary was de-
tained in a District of Columbia receiving home. At the 
detention hearing, counsel for the child was denied a 
request for judicial inquiry into probable cause. In 
refusing to enter such a finding, the court limited its 
inquiry to a determination of the advisability of releasing 
the boy to his mother and subsequently remanded the 
child to a detention facility. 
The defense counsel sought and obtained a writ of 
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia: 
"No person can be lawfully held in penal custody of the 
state without a prompt judicial determination of 
probable cause. The Fourth Amendment so provides and 
this constitutional mandate applies to juveniles as well as 
adults." 136 
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling 
of the District Court, asserting that both the fourth and 
fifth amendments require a judicial determination of 
probable cause .137 
Recommendations 
It would seem that the right to counsel as well as the 
right to a judicial determination of probable cause are 
necessary to minimize unwarranted government intrus-
ion into the life of a child accused of delinquent 
behavior. 
Another factor which argues for requiring a finding of 
probable cause is the present lack of sound predictive 
indicators of the danger a child poses to the community. 
As procedures are now structured, a judicial hearing 
which denies the child an opportunity to contest the 
factual base of a police report (the only evidence 
presently admitted as testimony which is relevant to the 
issue of the court's jurisdiction) has little to recommend 
it to those who are concerned about procedural justice 
for the child. 
We recommend, therefore, that a detention hearing 
which includes judicial inquiry into probable cause be 
incorporated into the proposed arraignment or prelim-
inary hearing procedures. The hearing should be held not 
later than 48 hours after the filing of a delinquency 
petition and should follow the warning of rights, the 
recital of the allegation, and the plea-taking procedures 
of the proposed arraignment proceedings. The intake 
officer should continue to advise the child of his right to 
counsel and his right to remain silent when the child is 
first admitted to detention, but he should accept the 
additional responsibility of guaranteeing that the child 
has an opportunity to consult with counsel as well as 
with his guardian ad !item before the arraignment and 
detention hearing. 
Bail 
Assuming that there is a finding of probable cause at 
the detention hearing, the question of securing the 
child's release becomes more difficult. Under current 
procedures the child has no absolute right to bail; the 
issue of release constitutes a discretionary matter to be 
decided by the juvenile court judge. 138 The criteria he 
applies are those examined earlier .139 
Before juvenile court legislation was instituted, 
children charged with crimes were presumably entitled 
to the same right to bail as adult offenders; for the child 
was held legally responsible (subject to certain presump-
tions based upon his age) for his criminal conduct and 
could be subjected to the same punishment inflicted 
upon adults convicted of the same offense. 140 
The United States Constitution, however, does not 
expressly grant a right to bail for juvenile or adult 
offenders, 141 and the .Supreme Court has held that the 
denial of bail in some statutorily prescribed instances 
does not constitute a violation of the due process of law. 
The "no excessive bail" clause was "never. ... thought 
to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to pro-
vide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases where 
it is proper to grant bail."142 In a more recent case, the 
Court also held that: 
"[T] he fact that a liberty cannot be inhibited without 
due process of law does not mean that it can under no 
circumstances be inhibited. The requirements of due 
process are a function not only of the extent of the 
governmental restriction imposed, but also of the extent 
f h . c h . t" ,,143 o t e necessity ior t e restnc ion. 
In light of those holdings, it appears that the juvenile 
court's bail practice, a creation of the state legislature, 
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40 
may not constitute a violation of due process standards 
prescribed by the Federal Constitution. ~ith re~ard to 
holdings of the Connecticut courts, the picture 1s 
basically the same; the present constitutional law is that 
"no person shall be arrested, detained or punished, 
except in cases clearly warranted by law." 144 _Pre-h_earing 
or preventive detention of juveniles and the d1scret1onary 
application of bail are so warranted. 145 
Recommendations 
There are some practical considerations which 
militate against extending an absolute right to bail in 
delinquency proceedings. First, money should not be a 
determinant when the detention or release of a child is 
at issue.146 Recent bail reform legislation emphasizes 
that admission to bail does not necessarily imply that a 
money bond must be posted.147 Secondly,juvenile 
court legislation makes it clear that the detention of a 
child prior to adjudication must turn upon a determina-
tion of how the welfare of the child will best be 
served. 148 The question, then, is whether the parent or 
legal guardian is both willing and able to provide ade-
quate custodial supervision of the child pending adjudi-
cation or disposition. The determination of that 
question is in keeping with the philosophy which was 
h . h . ·1 149 H intended to c aractenze t e JUvem e court. ence 
the extension of an absolute right to bail may cause un-
necessary problems if the parent is not willing to care 
for the child prior to adjudication. For example, in the 
matter of A. M. the child's mother filed a complaint 
with the court and refused to take custody of the child 
after being informed of the court's intention to release 
him. Should an absolute right to bail extend to the child 
under those circumstances? If it does, who will act as 
surety for the child? Where will he find shelter? 
It would seem that the more realistic approach is to 
create a presumption in favor of release in all delinquen-
cy cases a.nd to continue the practice of all~wing the 
judge to exercise his discretion (after a finding of 
probable cause). But in those cases where detention may 
be the consequence of conflict between the parent and 
the child it should be the additional resoonsibility of 
counsel, ~orking in conjunction with th~ guardian ad 
/item, to secure alternative placement for the child 
pending adjudication. 
Conclusion 
This article began with an examination of the current 
detention practices in the New Haven juvenile court and 
continued with a reappraisal of the criteria and pro-
cedures for detention in light of the due process issues 
raised by the Gault decision. The recommendations 
which follow from that reappraisal include: (I) the 
elimination of the initial interview in judicial cases; (2) 
the replacement of that interview with an arraignment 
hearing, to be held not more than 15 days after referral 
in cases involving no detention, and not more than 48 
hours after the filing of a delinquency petition in cases 
that do; (3) the guarantee of counsel as well as of a 
guardian ad !item at the arraignment-hearing (with 
sufficient notice of such guarantees before the hearings); 
( 4) provision for waiver of the right to counsel, and the 
right to remain silent subsequent to the appraisal of 
those rights and the recital of allegations during the 
subsequent to appraisal of rights, recital qf allegations 
hearing with a judicial determination of probable cause 
subsequent ot appraisal of rights, recital of allegations 
and entering the plea at arraignment. 
Though these recommendations are addressed 
primarily to more extensive formalities at the pre-
adjudication stage, we cannot over-emphasize that the 
greatest care should be exercised by the court at every 
phase of the delinquency process. To emphasize the 
necessity of procedural regularity, however, is not to 
denigrate the court's ideal of caring for the child. 
Speaking to this point, the Task Force observed that 
"Willingness to understand and treat people who 
threaten public safety and security should be nurtured, 
not turned aside as hopeless sentimentality, both because 
it is civilized and because social protection itself 
demands constant search for alternatives to the crude and 
limited expedient of condemnation and punishment. But 
neither should it be allowed to outrun reality. The 
juvenile court is a court of law, charged like other 
agencies of criminal justice with protecting the com-
munity against threatening conduct. .. What should 
distinguish the juvenile from the criminal courts is 
greater emphasis on rehabilitation, not exclusive pre-
. "th "t ,,150 occupation w1 1 . 
It is the juvenile court's dual role of protecting both 
the child and the community which demands the careful 
consideration of each individual's rights; and no phase of 
juvenile justice procedures requires more careful con-
sideration than that of detention of youthful offenders. 
I. Butler, Erewhon, New York: Modern Library (pp. 
108-110). 
2. For general background of juvenile court legislation and 
handling of juvenile offenders prior to such legislation, 
see Platt, The Child Savers, The Emergence of the 
Juvenile Court in Chicago, 1969. 
3. The first juvenile court legislation was enacted by the 
Illinois legislature in 1899. "It did not create a new court; 
it did include most of the features that have since come to 
distinguish the juvenile court. The original act and the 
amendments that shortly followed brought together d 
under one jurisdiction cases of dependency'. ne~lect an 
delinquency-the last category com~rehendmg m~or~ 
. "bles and children threatened by immoral associations ~1;~ell as criminal law breakers." Task Force Report, 
Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, p. 3. (1967) 
4. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104, 119-120 
(1909). 
5. The adoption of this philosophy is attributed to a reaction 
against the treatment of children in adult criminal courts. 
As to the inadequacy of such a judgement in the absence 
of other measures, see Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The 
Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 167. 13
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*The offense defined as serious and actually committed 
include: aggravated assault, rape, robbery, breaking and 
entering, and Possession of a dangerous weapon. 
6. Lou,Juvenile Courts in the United States, at 1 (1927); 
and Platt, supra note 2. 
7. E.g. Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 9. 
8. E.g. Duffy, In Re Gault and The Privilege Against Self 
Incrimination in the Juvenile Court, 51 Marquette L. Rev. 
68, 69 (1967). 
9. E.g., Lehman, A Juvenile's Right to Counsel in a 
Delinquency Hearing, 17 Juv. Ct. Jdgs. J. 5 3, 54 (1966). 
10. In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966) n. 22 records: "The 
Appendix to the opinion of Judge Prettyman in Pee v. 
United States, 107 US. App. D.C. 4 7, 274 F. 2d 556 
(1959) lists authority :in 51 jurisdictions to this effect. 
Even rules required by due process in civil proceedings, 
however, have not generally been deemed compulsory as 
to proceedings effecting juveniles ... " 
11. Commonwealth v. Fisher 213 Pa. 48, 62 A ti. 198 (1905) 
was the first and most often cited case stressing the civil 
nature of juvenile court proceedings. 
11 a. 387 U.S. I (1966). 
12. 383U.S.541(1966). 
13. 383 U.S., at 556, citing Handler, The Juvenile Court and 
the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 
1965 Wise. L. Rev. 7; Harvard Law Review notes; and 
various congressional materials set forth in 38 3 U.S., at 
546, Note 5. 
14. 387 U.S. I supra, at note I la, p. 13. 
15. Note, The Parens Patriac Theory and its Effect on the 
Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 Pitt. 
L. Rev. 887, 909 (1966) remarking: "Generally, the 
courts have treated the problem of the child's right to 
liberty in terms of the parent's right to custody of the 
child ... The proposition that the child may not assert his 
right against the state acting as parens patriae follows 
from the analogy to the parent-child relationship. [T] he 
child is not entitled, either by the laws of nature or of the 
state, to absolute freedom, but is subjected to the 
restraint and custody of a natural or legally constituted 
guardian to whom he owes obediance and subjection." 
16. The Connecticut Juvenile Court, Its Structure, Philosphy, 
Procedure, at 2, (1959). 
17. Conn. Gen. Stat. (Rev. 1958) see 17-54. 
18. See, 41 Conn. Bar Jour. 201, at 210. 
19. Id., at 219 but accuracy demands that we acknowledge 
the existence of a second temporary receiving center in 
the second district. 
20. By maintaining quarters for members of the detention 
staff, the court makes it possible for an intake officer to 
be on duty at all times. The primary benefit of such an 
arraignment is that there is always an officer to authorize 
the detention or release of a child-even after 5: 00 p.m., 
the end of the normal working day for other court 
officials. 
21. Cf, Freed and Wald, Bail in the United States, at 105 
(1964). 
22. From an interview with a member of the New Haven 
staff, April 4, 1970. 
23. Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 17-46; but also see sec. 17-64 pro-
viding: "When accomodations for the temporary deten-
tion of children in state operated detention homes are un-
available, the judge of each district of the juvenile court 
shall arrange with some agency or person within such 
jurisdiction for the use of suitable accomodations to serve 
as a temporary detention place as may be required ... " 
24. While it may not be as surprising to note that treatment 
programs and facilities are not available to adult offenders 
incarcerated pending trial, other studies have indicated 
that the same situation is common among most adult 
penal institutions. e.g. Brockett, W.A., Pre-Trial Deten-
tion: "The Most Critical Period". Unpublished thesis, 
Yale Law School 1970. 
25. Conn. Gen. Stat. at sec. 17-56 the statute provides that 
judges shall meet annually to "make orders and rules to 
carry into effect the provisions of this part, including 
suitable forms of procedure thereunder. .. " 
26. W. Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts 
23 (U.S. Children's Bur. Pub. No. 437, 1966). 
27. The actual Rule reads as follows: "Rule 7-Basis For 
Detention-(1) no child shall be placed in detention or 
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thereafter held unless it appears from the available facts 
that there is reasonable cause to believe that the child is 
responsible for the acts alleged and that there is (A) a 
strong probability the child will run away prior to court 
disposition, or (B) a strong probability the child will com-
mit or attempt to commit, other offenses injurious to him 
or to the community before court disposition, or (C) 
reasonable cause to believe that the child's continued 
residence in (his) (her) home pending disposition will not 
safeguard the best interests of the child and the com-
munity because of the serious and dangerous nature of 
the (act) (acts) set forth in the attached delinquency 
petition, or (D) a need to hold a child for another jurisdic-
tion." Rules of the Juvenile Court for the State of 
Connecticut, reprint from the Conn. L. four.; June 25, 
1968. (hereafter cited as Court Rules]. 
28. Freed and Wald, supra at note 21 at 97. 
29. C.F ., National Council on Crime and Delinquency [here-
after cited as N .C.C.D.], Locking Them Up: A Study of 
Initial Juvenile Detention Decisions in Selected California 
Counties 118 (1968). See also Ferster, Snethen, and 
Courtless, Juvenile Detention: Protection Prevention or 
Number not % 
Detained Total Detained 
35 58 40% 
48 50 4% 
IO 15 33% 
5 41 88% 
4 14 71% 
0 8 IOO% 
2 10 80% 
0 6 100% 
10 37 73% 
2 15 87% 
2 10 80% 
0 3 100% 
118 267 56% 
Punishment? 38 Fordham L. Rev. 161 (1969) [Hereafter 
referred to as Juvenile Detention]. See also notes 43 
through 57 and accompanying text herein. 
30. Juvenile Detention, supra Note 29 at 164. 
31. N .C.C.D., Standard and Guides for the Detention of 
Children and Youth 15 (2d. e'd., 1961) (hereafter cited as 
Detention Standards]. 
32. N.C.C.D., Juvenile Detention, in Correction in the United 
States, 13 Crime and Deling. 11, 29 (1967) [hereafter 
cited as Corrections) . 
33. Court Rules, supra at Note 27. 
34. From an interview with the supervisor of the probation 
staff, New Haven, May, 1970. 
35. App. A, which presents this data has been ommitted. 
36. Corrections, supra at note 32. 
3 7. No child was detained (in 1969) for a period longer than 15
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Table B1 
Children Adjudicated Who Were Subsequently Committed 
1) Detained and subsequently committed: 37% 
2) Not detained but subsequently committed: 7% 
3) Adjudicated and subsequently committed: 24% 
Number Children 
Committed Committed-by Offense 
Serious offense 2 3.3 
Incorrigibility 10 15.9 
Runaway 2 3.3 
Incorrigibility 
plus Serious Offense 5 7.9 
Table B2 
Violation of Probation 
by virtue of· 
Serious offense 8 12.6 
Against property 8 12.6 
Auto theft 4 6.3 
Incorrigibility 15 23.9 
Incorrigibility 
plus Serious Offense 9 14.2 
Total 63 100% 
Number 
Number Detained not Detained 

























*This column represents the ratio of "Number Detained and Committed" in Table B to the "Number Detained" in Table A. 
For example, under incorrigibility in Table A, note that 36 children were detained, while under incorrigibility in Table B, I 0 
out of the 36 (27 .7%) were subsequently committed. 
27 days. However, the average time interval between 
initial referral and adjudication wa·s 121 days. Conse-
quently, it appears that fear of the child not appearing on 
the scheduled hearing date is not an actual reason for 
detention under the current New Haven practice. 
38. Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 17~66 authorizes such investigations 
but the probation officer seldom has the time or the 
opportu11ity to conduct an inquiry into the child's case 
history when such child is held less than 48 hours. 
39. The tables correlating the runaway allegation with data 
from the child's social history is not included herein but 
"inability to locate the parent" and "immediate threat of 
physical abuse" accounted for the detention of over 85% 
of all those children charged with "runaway" but who 
were also released within 48 hours of initial detention. 
40. Court Rules, supra at note 27. 
41. Alaska Stat. sec. 4 7 .10.140(a) (1962); Cal. Welfare & 
Inst'ns Code sec. 628(d) (West supp. 1969); Colo. Rev. 
Stat. Ann Sec. 22-2-2 (supp. I 967); Ill. Ann. Stat. Ch. 37, 
sec. 703-6(2) (Smith-Hurd 1969); Ind. Ann. Stat. Sec. 
9-3212 (Replacement 1956); Md. Ann. Code art. 26, 
sec. 70-1 l(a) (I) (Supp. 1969); Mich. Stat. Ann. sec. 27. 
3 I 78 (598.15) (6) (1962); Neb. Rev. Stat. sec. 43-205.03 
(1968); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act sec. 739(b) (1963); N.D. Cent. 
Code Sec. 27-20-14 (Supp. 1969); Utah Code Ann. sec. 
55-10-91(1) (Supp. 1969);Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, sec. 
643(a) (Supp. 1969). from Juv. Det. Supra Note 32 
at 166. 
42. Detention Standards, supra note 31 at 15. 
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Offenses Committed Between Initial Referral and Adjudication 
I. Average time interval between initial referral and hearing 
A. In cases characterized by detention upon initial complaint: 112 days 
B. In cases characterized by no detention upon initial complaint: 130 days 
II. Repeaters: 42% repeated (21/50) 
A. Number of children: 
Detained Not detained Total 
Repeaters 12 38% 9 43% 21 
Non-repeaters 17 12 29 
Total 29 21 so 
B. Number of children: Previous Record 
Previous Record No Previous Record 
Detained Not Detained Total Detained Not Detained Total 
Repeaters IO 8 18 36% 2 3 6% 
Non-repeaters 15 3 18 2 9 11 
Total 36 72% 14 28% 
III. Number of Offenses Committed: 
Against person 5 
Against property 40 
Auto theft 9 
43. Court Rules, supra at note 27. 
44. Juvenile Detention, supra at note 29, citing D. Borden, 
Report of Youth Aid Division 38 (1967), an unpublished 
1967 study for the committee on the Administration of 
Justice. 
45. Id. at 167. 
46. See Table A. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. N.C.C.D., Guides for Juv. Court Judges 46 (1963). 
Incorrigibility 6 
Runaway 14 
Total Number of Offenses 74 
50. See testimony of Judge Harold H. Green and Professor 
Alan Dershowitz, Hearings on Amendment to the Bail 
Reform Act of 1966 before the Subcomm. on Constitu-
tional Rights of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 9lst 
Cong., 1st sess., 29, 172(1969) speaking about predictive 
indicators in regard to adult offender. No studies on 
juvenile offenders are yet available. 
51. See Table A 
5 2. Taken from a recent but undated inter-office memoran-
dum entitled Detention Admission Regulations -
applicable to New Haven practice. 
53. See Table A. 
54. See Table B. 17
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55. Corrections, supra Note 32, at 36 reports that of 409, 218 71. E.g., Warner, Juvenile Detention in the· United States 15 2 
detained, about 167,000 were neither committed or ( 1933). There, she notes that "The effect of detention on 
placed on probation. any child may be more far reaching than is evident on the 
surface. Subjecting a child to a period of congregate 
56. Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 17-69 provides that "commitments detention is a risk. Association with children of all degrees 
by the juvenile court shall be for an indeterminant time of delinquency exposes the child to a contagion as real as 
but shall terminate when the child reaches the age of that of infectious disease and stimulates delinquent 
twenty-one except in the case of mental deficients or interest if nothing more." 
defective delinquents ... " 
72. Jn Re Macidon, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861, 867 (1966) (quoting 
57. See Table B. Report of the Governors' Special Comm. on Juv. Justice, 
pt. 1, at 42 (1960). 
58. 121 days represents the average of "A" and "B" under 73. See notes 58 through 60 and accompanying text. 
Roman number I in Table C. 
59. The statistics recorded under the heading "recidivism" 
74. From an interview with police sgt. of New Haven Youth 
are the product of a sample study in.eluding 5 0 cases Div. cf. Juv. Dt., supra note 32, at 175. 
selected at random. With regard to these statistics, there-
fore, it is important to note that their actual statistical 75. This rate represents the percentages of those detained out 
relevance has not yet been determined. All other of all children referred in 1969. 
statistics, however, reflect a pattern among the entire 45 judicially handled population. 76. The correlation table showing the relationship between 
police referral and total referral is not included herein 
60. Compare, Wheeler and Cottrell, Juvenile Delinquency, Its but the breakdown indicated that 94% of the children 
Prevention and Control (1966) at 3, remarking: " .... as detained were brought in by police, 3% by the par en ts, 
of now, there are no demonstratable and proven methods and 3% by schools and other agencies. Compare this to 
for reducing the incidence of serious delinquent acts 98.4% of all juvenile court cases handled in Chicago being 
through preventive or rehabilitative proceedings." referred by police during 1964. Citizens Committee on 
the Family Court, Bulletin 4 (April 1965). 
61. Ketchum, Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, in 
Justice For the Child, 27 (Rosenheim ed. 1962). 77. See, Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 17-65. 
62. Id., at 26. 78. It is conceded by various members of the probation staff 
that the decision "to detain a child for a day or two is 
63. See Detention Standards, supra note 31, at 2, 8. sometimes the result of an arresting officer's heated 
recommendation." 
64. Uniform Juv. Ct. Act. secs. 2 (6), 14. 
79. The Intake Officer is most often a probation officer 
65. Model Rules for Juv. Ct. rules 1.5, 12-18 (1969). vested with the responsibility of making an initial deter-
mination of whether the allegations against the child are 
66. E.g., Ariz., Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 8-226(c) (Supp. 1969); sufficient to invoke the statutory jurisdiction of the 
Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code sec. 506 (West 1966); Colo. juvenile court. For general discussion of the intake 
Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 22-2-3(1) (Supp. I 967); Hawaii Rev. function, see Palmier, Juvenile Court Intake: Form and 
Stat. sec. 571-33 (1968); Ill. Ann Stat. ch. 37, sec. 703-3 Function, 5 Willamette L. Journal 121 (1968);Sheridan, 
(Smith-Hurd Supp. I 969); Md. Ann Code art. 26, secs. Juvenile Court Intake, 2 Journ. Fam. Law 139 (1962). 
70-11, 70-12 (supp. 1969); N.D. Cent. Code sec. 
27-20-16(4) (Supp. 1969); Ore. Rev. Stat. sec. 419.575(1) 80. Id. Juvenile Court Intake, at 146. 
(Replacement 1968); Utah Code Ann. sec. 55-10-91(1) 
(Supp. 1969). 81. Id., at 144. 
67. But see, Detention Standards, supra note 31 at 2; and 82. Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 14. 
Freedand Wald, supra note 25, at 109 discussing the use 
of shelter care for some delinquents. 83. Id., at 14. 
68. Status offenses are those cla~sified as delinquencies only 84. Juvenile Court Intake, supra note 79, at 144. 
if committed by juveniles, and include truancy, runnin.g 
away, and incorrigibility. "The distinction [between the 85. Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 14. 
status offender and the neglected child) is theoretically 
questiqnable and distorted in practice ... "Breckenridge 86. Court Rules, supra note 27, art. V, rule 8 (I). 
and Abbott, The Delinquent Child and the Home, 
11-12 (1912). 87. Id., Art. VIII, rule 20 (1). 
69. E.g., Eaton, Detention Facilities in Non-Metropolitan 
Counties, 17 Juv. Ct. Judges J. 9, 11-12 (1966). The 88. Id., art. V, rule 7 (2). 
question of physically restricting custody is not deter-
89. mined "Solely on the basis of the gravity of the mis- Id., art. V, rule 7 (3). 
conduct charged. A self-confident runaway who sees no 
90. reason why he should not keep going may be more of a Conn. Gen Stat. sec. 17-66; Court Rules, supra note 27,. 
security risk than the juvenile burglar who, when at art. II, rule 2 (7), 2 (8). 
apprehended, reverts to the status of a frightened and 91. The New Haven practice includes procedures for waiver of 
homesick small boy." the right to a detention hearing. In most cases involving 
See notes 43 through 4 7 as well as accompanying text. 
detention beyond 48 hours, the probation officer invokes 
70. those procedures in order to speak with the child about 
But for opposite view, see N.C.C.D., Guides for Juvenile his case - if the child has waived the right to counsel and 
Court Judges, supra note 49, at 4 7-48, noting that some the right to remain silent ~but his primary objective is to 
communfoes have successfully operated a variety of secure the child's waiver of the right to a detention 
shelter care facilities for law violators. hearing. 
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92. Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 17-66. of advocate, noting the conflict of interests which may 
result from concern with obtaining rehabilitation for the 
93. 99 Conn. 70, at 78, 121 Atl. 678, at 681 (1923). child. He also quite rightly raises question about the 
94. Id. 
qualifications of most lawyers to make such decisions. 
120. Issacs, The Role of the Lawyer Representing Minors in 
95. Court Rules, supra note 27, at Art. I. The New Family Court, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 501, 506-507 
96. This authority derives from Conn. Gen. Stat. sec. 17-63. 
(1963). 
121. In requiring the judicial officer to enter a finding on the 
97. Court Rules, supra note 27, at Art V., rule 8 (3). basis of the information presented, that there is a sub-
stantial probability that the child committed the offense 
98. Id. at art VIII, rule 23. with which he is charged, the test to apply should be 
comparable to the civil test for the issuance of a pre-
99. If the case becomes a contested matter, the prosecutor, or liminary injunction; i.e. "likelihood of eventual success on 
"court advocate" as he is called, and counsel for the child the merits." W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc. 354 F.2d 
conduct an adversarial hearing with the judge presiding. 868, 872 (2d Cir. 1966). 
Witnesses are sworn and rules of evidence are recognized. 
122. Court Rules, supra note 27, art V, Rule 9 (1). 
100. Court Rules, supra note 27, art V, Rule 9 (I). 
46 123. Id., at art V, rule 7 (1 ). 
101. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F. 2nd 393, 396 ( 1968). 
124. In unusually complicated situations, the judge will inquire 
102. Court Rules, supra note 27, at art V, rule 7 (1). into the facts of the case-not to enter a finding of 
probable cause but to understand what the allegations 
103. Jn Re Gault, supra note 10, at 41and55. actually entail. However, because there are only 2 judges 
104. 343 U.S. 436 (1966). 
serving the New Haven Juvenile Court, it is likely that the 
judge presiding at the detention hearing will also preside 
at the adjudicatory hearing. In order to prevent this and 
105. Jn Re Gault, supra note I 0, at 44. thereby minimize the possibility of prejudicing the child's 
case, the judge presiding over the detention hearing will 
106. Id., at 55. disqualify himself from the adjudicatory phase if he feels 
that he has heard too much. 
107. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
125. Task Force Report, supra note 3, at 37. 
108. Court Rules, supra note 27, at art. V, rule 7 (5). 
126. Id., at 37 the Report does recommend that the authoriza-
109. In Re Gault, supra note I 0, at 36. tion of detention be limited to probation officers but the 
object of the recommendation is to "develop and enforce 
110. See, Williams v. Huff 142 F. 2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1944). The a uniform detention policy''. It is the contention of this 
second opinion in this case, again reversing the District commentary that the Task Force recommendation falls 
Court is at 146 F. 2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1945) In which the short of enabling the juvenile court to realize a uniform 
District of Columbia Circuit reversed the discharge of the detention policy if that recommendation is meant to 
habeas petition of a seventeen-year-old convicted of imply that individual probation officers within a given 
assault without the assistance of counsel. The court found probation staff may continue to authorize detention by 
the validity of an alleged waiver to be a question of fact securing waivers; such practice would only perpetuate the 
and remanded to determine "whether, in light of his age, current New Haven condition: There are as many 
education and information, and all other pertinent facts, different detention policies as there are different proba-
[the defendant] ... has sustained the burden of prooving tion officers. 
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